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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID M. FISHER,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOS. 46195-2018, 46196-2018
ADA COUNTY NOS. CR-FE-2013-14688,
CR-FE-2014-4050
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In 2013, David M. Fisher, a forty-six-year-old man with no prior mental illness, had a
psychotic breakdown and became completely delusional. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia
and bipolar disorder. Due to his delusions, he engaged in criminal behavior and ultimately pled
guilty to three counts of intimidation of a witness. The district court imposed an aggregate
sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, and eventually placed Mr. Fisher on probation.
After about twenty-one months of success on probation, Mr. Fisher’s medication dosage was
lowered, he stopped taking his medication, and he became delusional again. He unfortunately
committed additional criminal offenses and admitted to violating his probation. The district court
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revoked his probation. Mr. Fisher then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for leniency. The
district court denied his motion. Mr. Fisher appeals.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2013, the State charged Mr. Fisher with lewd conduct, sexual abuse of a child,
intimidation of a witness, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and violation of a no contact order (CR-FE-2013-14688 or “the 2013 case”).
(R., pp.43–45.) In a separate case, in April 2014, the State charged Mr. Fisher with two counts of
intimidation of a witness (CR-FE-2014-4050 or “the 2014 case”). (R., pp.367–68.) The district
court consolidated the cases. (R., pp.114, 383.) From April 2014 to July 2014, the district court
committed Mr. Fisher for mental health treatment due to his inability to assist in the proceedings.
(R., pp.116–17, 121, 385–86, 387.)
In January 2015, Mr. Fisher pled guilty to intimidation of a witness in the 2013 case.
(R., pp.147–48.) In accordance with the plea agreement, the district court dismissed the other
charges. (R., p.168.) Mr. Fisher also pled guilty to the first count of intimidation of a witness and
entered an Alford1 plea to the second count of intimidation of a witness in the 2014 case.
(R., pp.419–20.)
In March 2015, the district court sentenced Mr. Fisher to five years fixed for intimidation
of a witness in the 2013 case. (R., pp.167–70.) In the 2014 case, the district court sentenced him
to five years indeterminate for each count of intimidation of a witness, to run consecutively.
(R., pp.428–31.) The 2013 and 2014 sentences would also run consecutively to each other.
(R., pp.168, 429.) As such, the district court imposed an aggregate sentence of fifteen years, with
five years fixed. (See R., pp.473–74 (amended judgment).)The district court also retained
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jurisdiction in both cases. (R., pp.168, 429.) In October 2015, the district court suspended the
sentences and placed Mr. Fisher on probation. (R., pp.215–20.)
In July 2017, the State filed a motion for probation violation. (R., pp.277–78, 291–92
(amended motion), 532–33, 543–44 (amended motion.) The State alleged Mr. Fisher violated his
probation by committing two counts of misdemeanor unlawful entry and failing to maintain fulltime employment. (R., pp.292, 544.) Mr. Fisher admitted to the probation violations. (Tr., p.11,
L.23–p.13, L.8.) The district court revoked his probation and executed imposition of his
aggregate sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.35, Ls.16–20.) In both cases,
Mr. Fisher timely appealed from the district court’s revocation orders. (R., pp.298–300, 302–03,
549–51, 553–54.)
Mr. Fisher then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion requesting that the
district court reduce his aggregate sentence to fifteen years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.305–
08, 310–28, 556–59, 561–79.) The district court denied the motion. (R., pp.331–33, 582–84.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Fisher’s probation?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Fisher’s Rule 35 motion?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Fisher’s Probation
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation under
certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
3

review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the
Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f it
is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation,” the Court
examines “what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id. The determination of a
probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Mr. Fisher does not challenge his admissions to violating his probation. (Tr., p.11,
L.23–p.13, L.8.) “When a probationer admits to a direct violation of her probation agreement, no
further inquiry into the question is required.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App.
1992). Rather, Mr. Fisher submits the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation.
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily,” however. State v. Lee,
116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). “The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98
Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may
consider the defendant’s conduct before and during probation. Roy, 113 Idaho at 392.
In this case, Mr. Fisher submits the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation because his probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. At the time of the
initial offenses in 2013 and 2014, Mr. Fisher had a complete psychotic breakdown. (See
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Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),2 pp.8, 14–15; see generally PSI, pp.52–100
(psychiatric evaluation).) Mr. Fisher believed God, aliens, and angels were sending him mental
“downloads.” (PSI, pp.8, 14–15, 97–98.) He also believed the aliens would bring about a utopian
world, arrest the Illuminati (who controlled all major social and financial institutions, including
the courts and jails), and clear his charges. (PSI, pp.8, 97–98.) Mr. Fisher was diagnosed with
schizoaffective

disorder

with

symptoms

of schizophrenia (including

delusions

and

hallucinations) and bipolar disorder (including mania and grandiosity). (PSI, p.96.) His
psychiatric evaluator opined that Mr. Fisher’s mental illness caused the delusions, he was under
the influence of the delusions when he committed the offenses, and that he would not have
committed the offenses if he was not suffering from a major mental illness. (PSI, pp.97–99.)
Because his criminal behavior was solely attributable to his psychotic break, Mr. Fisher was
considered “a low risk for danger of violence to himself or others” if he maintained his mental
stability. (PSI, p.99.) In fact, prior to his psychotic episode, Mr. Fisher led a normal life. He
earned an Associate’s Degree through ITT and worked for Micron as an engineer for about
twenty-five years. (PSI, pp.13–14.) He had a good relationship with his family and two children.
(PSI, pp.10–11, 12.) His children were the most important aspect of his life, and he enjoyed
spending time with them and playing sports. (PSI, pp.11, 17.) At sentencing, Mr. Fisher received
letters of support from family and friends. (PSI, pp.44–46.) In sum, Mr. Fisher was a
contributing, productive member of society but for his recent mental health crisis.
Once Mr. Fisher obtained the proper treatment and medication, he regained control of his
mental health. From October 2015 to July 2017, Mr. Fisher succeeded on probation. (See
R., pp.224, 225, 226–27, 230, 231, 236, 237, 239, 249, 251, 257–59, 260, 261, 264, 268, 269.)
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The district court held regular review hearings, and Mr. Fisher continued to improve. The
minutes from these hearings indicate Mr. Fisher obtained employment at a call center, repeatedly
tested negative for drugs and alcohol, regularly took his medication, attended counseling,
enrolled in online classes, and engaged in positive activities. (See R., pp.224, 225, 226–27, 230,
231, 236, 237, 239, 249, 251, 257–59, 260, 261, 264, 268, 269.) In short, probation met the
objectives of rehabilitating Mr. Fisher while also providing adequate protection for society.
After about twenty-one months of success on probation, Mr. Fisher unfortunately had
another psychotic episode, leading to the probation violations at issue here. This mental health
setback, however, was caused by Mr. Fisher’s physician lowering his medication dosage from a
10-milligram injectable to a 5-milligram pill. (PSI, p.429.) After this lower dosage, Mr. Fisher’s
mental health symptoms returned, and he believed he did not need the medication. (PSI, p.429.)
He started to have delusions again. (PSI, p.429; Tr., p.25, L.7–p.29, L.5.) Once Mr. Fisher was
back in custody, he restarted his medication and drastically improved. (See Tr., p.27, L.22–p.28,
L.10.) He stated at the disposition hearing, “There are two different sides to me. There’s the side
that is manic, I do have a manic bipolar side, and I have a normal side, and right now I feel very
normal and ashamed and stupid for not being as faithful to my meds as I should have.” (Tr., p.32,
Ls.13–17.) By the time of the disposition hearing, Mr. Fisher had been in custody for almost one
year. (Tr., p.29, Ls.13–14.) Mr. Fisher’s mother set aside money to pay for the injectable
medication, and a physician was “happy to resume care” for Mr. Fisher. (Tr., p.30, Ls.2–6; PSI,
p.440.)
In light of this information of Mr. Fisher’s mental health, the district court abused its
discretion by revoking Mr. Fisher’s probation. Mr. Fisher’s mental illness was the single cause of
his probation violations, and he was otherwise successful on probation. The district court
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therefore failed to exercise reason and should have reinstated Mr. Fisher’s probation with
additional conditions to ensure the proper medication and treatment for his mental illness.
Mr. Fisher maintains that revocation was an abuse of discretion.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Fisher’s Rule 35 Motion
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and
apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The
Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett,
134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
Here, Mr. Fisher presented new and additional information that demonstrates his sentence
was excessive. He reiterated to the district court that he suffered “from an acute mental illness
that requires intensive medication management.” (R., pp.306, 557.) He argued:
The court is aware that when taking his medication the defendant
functioned very well and was not a threat to society. While in prison, there will be
no requirement that the defendant be medicated. Based on his prior history in the
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Ada County Jail, there is no reason to expect he will misbehave while
incarcerated thereby spurring IDOC to medicate him for behavior management.
If the defendant spends another two years incarcerated without required
medication, society is not being protected. His symptoms will arguably worsen
as his release approaches.
(R., pp.306–07, 557–58.) In addition, Mr. Fisher’s mother wrote a letter to the district court
describing Mr. Fisher’s past success on probation. (R., pp.310, 561.) She stated that Mr. Fisher
spent time fishing with his children and watching football with his parents. (R., pp.310, 561.)
She further explained that he was careful with his money and sold his car to help with expenses.
(R., pp.310, 561.) She believed that Mr. Fisher stopped taking the pill medication because of the
side effects. (R., pp.310, 561.) She hoped that, because a physician would give Mr. Fisher the
injectable medication again, that he would be reinstated on probation. (R., pp.310, 561.)
Additionally, a friend wrote a letter of support stating that Mr. Fisher was a kind, gentle,
positive, and loving person. (R., pp.311, 562.) She stated that his children meant “everything to
him.” (R., pp.311, 562.) She also recognized that Mr. Fisher’s bipolar diagnosis was “a horrible
struggle for him.” (R., pp.311, 562.) Along with these letters of support, Mr. Fisher included his
C-Notes from Ada County Jail and while on probation. These notes showed that Mr. Fisher
generally did very well on probation until he stopped taking his medication. (R., pp.314–23;
565–74.) Finally, Mr. Fisher wrote a letter to the district court explained that he “fully”
understood that he had to take his medication. (R., pp.327, 578.) He explained that he was
remorseful for his actions. (R., pp.327, 578.) Prior to his mental illness, he volunteered and spent
time with his family. (R., pp.327–28, 578–79.) If reinstated on probation, he would be committed
to taking his medication and relying on his mother for support. (R., pp.328, 579.) In light of this
new and additional information, Mr. Fisher argues the district court failed to exercise reason and
thus abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. The district court should have reduced
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Mr. Fisher’s aggregate sentence from fifteen years, with five years fixed, to fifteen years, with
three years fixed. (R., pp.305, 556.)

CONCLUSION
Mr. Fisher respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s orders revoking
his probation and remand his cases for a new disposition hearing. Alternatively, he respectfully
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or vacate the district court’s
orders denying his Rule 35 motions and remand his cases for further proceedings.
DATED this 26th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of November, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

JCS/eas

9

